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STAYING THE ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL
AWARDS: A FEDERAL PRACTICE
CONTRAVENING THE PURPOSES OF THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 1970, the United States acceded to the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, done at New York on June 10, 1958.'
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose
underlying American adoption and implementation of it, was
to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial
arbitration agreements in international contracts and to
unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are
observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory
countries
Since the United States accession to the New York Convention,
federal courts have affirmed its initial purpose to encourage
the recognition and enforcement of international commercial
arbitral awards. However, federal courts have not created a
unified standard for determining when to apply Article VI of
the Convention to stay enforcement of an award which is un-
der judicial review by the competent authority in the state
where the award was rendered.' "The issue of whether or not
1. 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention] (the
New York Convention entered into force for the original signatories on June 7,
1959 and entered into force for the United States on December 29, 1970); see also
Pub. L. No. 91-368, § 3274, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified by incorporation into the
Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (July 31, 1970). Subject to limited
exceptions, the New York Convention applies to "awards made in the territory of a
State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards
are sought" or 'non-domestic' awards rendered in the State of enforcement. New
York Convention, Article I.
2. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
3. Article VI states:
If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has
been made to a competent authority referred to in article V(1)(e), the
authority before which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if it
considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award
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to adjourn enforcement under Article VI of the Convention is a
relatively undeveloped area of the law. Few courts of appeals
have spoken on the issue, and district courts have resolved it
in divergent ways. Guidance as to when it is appropriate to
stay enforcement of an award... is virtually non-existent."4
Consequently, federal courts have shown a near absolute defer-
ence to the courts of the jurisdiction of origin. The Federal
courts tend to base rulings on an ad hoc determination that,
absent frivolous litigation by a party to have the award set
aside by a competent authority in the jurisdiction of origin, an
automatic stay shall be imposed.5 At the time the New York
Convention was incorporated into the Federal Arbitration Act,
commentators had already recognized the need for federal
courts to establish a common law for United States enforce-
ment of international arbitral awards.6
The purpose of this Note is to illustrate the lack of a defin-
itive federal standard and how this absence has led to a feder-
al practice contravening the purposes of the New York Conven-
tion. Part I of this Note lays a foundation for the discussion
that follows by underscoring the importance, purpose and his-
tory of the New York Convention as it relates to international
arbitration. Part III presents a canvas and analysis of federal
case law directly addressing Article VI of the Convention. Part
IV summarizes federal case law and posits that the failure of
federal courts to accept the importance of party autonomy is
the foundation of their inability to create a standard promoting
the goals of the New York Convention.
and may also, on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the
award, order the other party to give suitable security.
New York Convention, supra note 1; See also infra note 25 (text of Article V(1)(e)).
4. Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir.
1998) (citations omitted) (see infra Part III.E for a full case description); see also
Michael H. Strub, Jr., Note, Resisting Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Under Article V(1)(e) and Article VI of the New York Convention: A Proposal for
Effective Guidelines, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (April 1990) (illustrating the nonexis-
tence of a federal standard for staying enforcement under the New York Conven-
tion).
5. Compare infra Parts llI.A., B. and C., with Part III.D.
6. See Gerald Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of
Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U. L. REV. 1, 26 (1971).
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II. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION AND ARTICLE VI
A. The Development of International Commercial Arbitration
International business persons, and lawyers alike exhibit a
growing reliance upon arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism.7 Some of the advantages offered by arbitration
over the uncertainty of foreign litigation include predictability,
reduced expense, informality, speedy determination and neu-
trality of determination.8 Furthermore, arbitration is predicat-
ed upon the intentions of the parties affected, allowing those
parties to tailor the parameters of a resolution to the particu-
larities of their relationship.9
Nevertheless, arbitration is an ineffectual method of inter-
national dispute resolution if the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought does not have assets sufficient to satisfy the
arbitral award in the state where the decision was rendered
and if no foreign state enforces the award. If enforcement does
7. The popularity of arbitration is illustrated by the fact that "[b]etween 1979
and 1990, the International Chamber of Commerce alone received 3,500 [arbitra-
tion] cases, as many as it had received between 1923 and 1978 . .. ." Amber Lee
Smith, Finding Information About International Commercial Arbitration, in INTRO-
DUCTION To TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL TRANSACTION, 335 (Marilyn J. Raisch &
Roberta I. Shaffer eds., 1995). From 1987 to 1995 alone the number of cases be-
fore the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) increased from 285 to 427.
Stephen T. Ostrowski & Yuval Shany, Note, Chromalloy: United States Law and
International Arbitration at the Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1650, 1693 n.1 (cit-
ing to News from the Court, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., Dec. 1996, at 4, 5). "In
1998, the American Arbitration Association's International Center for Dispute Reso-
lution (Center), . .. experienced a continued increase in the number of new cases
filed with the Center. Approximately 380 cases were filed in 1998, representing an
eleven percent increase in case filings from 1997. Marc J. Goldstein, International
Commercial Arbitration, 33 INT'L LAW. 389, 400 (Summer 1999).
8. See Aksen, supra note 6, at 2-3; Robert B. von Mehren, Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 771 P.L.I./COMM. 147, 155 (Feb.
1998) ("the gradual harmonization and internationalization of arbitration practices
and the development of a community of international arbitrators . . . has made
the international arbitral forum a much more familiar and perhaps a more pre-
dictable place than the foreign courtroom.") Id.
9. See generally PHILIPPE FOuCHARD ET AL., GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, paras. 44-50 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John
Savage eds., 1999) ("The contract between the parties is the fundamental constitu-
ent of international arbitration. It is the parties' common intention which confers
powers upon the arbitrators." Id. at para. 46 (yet, the authors note that although
party autonomy governs, the influence of international arbitral institutions shapes
the procedures by which arbitration is conducted)).
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not occur than there is no incentive for the parties to contract
for, or participate in, an arbitral proceeding. As such, arbitra-
tion has only recently gained favor by international business
interests located in the United States.0
In the past, American judges exhibited a resistance to
arbitration based merely upon the residual effects of an un-
written rule established by English judges as early as the 17th
century." However, overcrowding of the federal docket in the
1980's eventually led federal "judges to welcome arbitration as
a means of, in effect, 'contracting out' cases that might other-
wise have to be litigated."2 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.3 epitomizes the newly adopted policy
of the federal courts and reflects a bias in favor of arbitration
as a form of dispute resolution:
Here [the presumption in favor of enforcement of freely
negotiated contractual choice-of-forum provisions] is rein-
forced by the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dis-
pute resolution. And at least since this Nation's accession...
to the [New York] Convention... and the implementation of
the Convention in the same year by amendment of the Feder-
al Arbitration Act, that federal policy applies with special
force in the field of international commerce.14
The Mitsubishi Motors Corp. Court recognized that at the
enforcement stage, the courts in the state of enforcement will
have the opportunity to review whether federal law was prop-
erly applied. 5 However, Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for
the Supreme Court, went on to say that "it will be necessary
for national courts to subordinate domestic notions of
10. See generally Smith, supra note 7; Ostrowski, supra note 7.
11. See Jose A. Cabranes, An Address to the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York (Oct. 25, 1997), reprinted in 70 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22 (MarlApr. 1998)
(English judges were influenced by the monetary advantages of a crowded docket
and thus ruled against enforcement of arbitration awards); see also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 n.14 (1985) (en-
forcing a choice of forum clause to arbitrate a dispute concerning federal antitrust
law before an arbitral panel located in Japan).
12. Cabranes, supra note 11, at 23.
13. 473 U.S. 614.
14. Id. at 631 (citation omitted).
15. Id. at 638; see infra note 25 (Article V(2)(b) allows the enforcing court to
refuse enforcement of the award if it would be contrary to the public policy of the
enforcing court's country).
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arbitrability to the international policy favoring commercial
arbitration."6
B. Adoption of the New York Convention
Currently, the New York Convention consists of 121 mem-
bers, of which 24 are original signatories.' The resistance of
the American judiciary and conflicts in federal legislation led
to a ten year delay from the time the Convention came into
force until its implementation by the United States."8 The
New York Convention was adopted as a response to the Gene-
va Convention of September 26, 1927 on the "Execution of
Foreign Arbitral Awards." 9 Only by understanding the short-
comings of the Geneva Convention can the goals of the New
York Convention be fully understood.
Most notably, the Geneva Convention requires that "courts
in a 'host' country may only grant enforcement if it has been
established that the award is 'final' in its country of origin."0
Therefore, a system of "double exequator" arises in which a
prevailing party needs to petition the approval of courts in the
jurisdictions of origin and enforcement before an award can be
enforced. "'Exequator' describes the process whereby an enforc-
ing court authorizes the execution within its jurisdiction of a
foreign judgment or award."2' Double exequator "lead[s] to
delaying tactics on the part of the respondent who could fore-
stall the award becoming final by instituting setting aside
16. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 639.
17. See New York Convention, supra note 1; see also United Nations Head-
quarters, Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Done at New York on 10 June 1958,
available at http:/www.un.org (providing an up to date and authoritative status on
treaties deposited with the Secretariat Unit of the United Nations).
18. See Aksen, supra note 6, at 4-5; see generally Cabranes, supra note 11.
19. 92 L.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Geneva Convention] (the Geneva Convention
still exists and consists of 27 members, of which, the United States is not). See
FOUCHARD, supra note 9, at para. 247. See also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas
Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969,
973 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming the district court's confirmation of a foreign award
and recognizing that t]he 1958 Convention's basic thrust was to liberalize proce-
dures for enforcing foreign arbitral awards . . . ."). Id.
20. See FOUCHARD, supra note 9, at para. 245 (finality of an award means
that it is not subject to the possibility of appeal by a court or other such authori-
ty in the country of origin).
21. Ostrowski, supra note 7, at n.29.
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procedures in the country in which the award was made."22
The goal of the New York Convention was to eliminate a sys-
tem of double exequator.'
Additionally, the New York Convention made several other
changes "to liberalize procedures for enforcing foreign arbitral
awards" such as shifting the burden of proof,' limiting the
party against whom enforcement is sought to seven defens-
es,2 and requiring that an award only be "binding" and not
"final."26 As a result of the changes adopted under the New
22. ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, 267 (1981).
23. See FOUCHARD supra note 9.
24. New York Convention, at art. IV.
25. Article V states:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the
request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party fur-
nishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement
is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the
law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is
not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award
was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceed-
ings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or,
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided
that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separat-
ed from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may -be recognized and en-
forced; or,
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; or,
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which,
or under the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused
if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforce-
ment is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or,
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.
New York Convention, supra note 1.
26. Id. at art. V(1)(e).
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York Convention, federal courts now recognize when deciding
whether to deny enforcement in accordance with one of the
Article V defenses that "the confirmation of an arbitration
award is a summary proceeding that merely makes what is
already a final arbitration award a judgment of the court."27
C. Caveats to the Understanding of Article VI
The federal courts' failure to establish a standard guiding
the stay of enforcement under the New York Convention re-
sults in a practice which contradicts the Convention's goals. To
fully understand why the courts' failure is problematic, one
must first recognize that parallel analyses cannot be made
from other areas of law. Analysis of Article VI is separate and
distinct from any inquiry into the Article V defenses, enforce-
ment of foreign judgments or, domestic arbitral awards.
Article V provides seven specific defenses as grounds for
refusing enforcement, and although every American case in-
volving an issue of a stay under Article VI has involved at
least one of these defenses,"m the considerations must be sepa-
rate and distinct. Not only does Article VI differ because it pro-
vides for a discretionary standard,29 but it also invites a risk
of inconsistent judicial interpretation not present under Article
V. By definition, an enforcing court risks the possibility of an
inconsistent finding of whether to enforce an award since that
award is contemporaneously under review by the "competent
authority" in the jurisdiction of origin, "or under law of which,
that award was made."0 Moreover, whereas Article VI deci-
sions concern the likelihood of success under the guise of the
law of the jurisdiction of origin, a decision to deny enforcement
under Article V focuses upon an application of the laws of the
27. Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickhol, 750 F.2d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 1984) (denying
defenses to the enforcement of an award which fall outside the parameters of the
New York Convention, and in so doing, recognizing that although an "award need
not actually be confirmed by a court to be valid" judicial assistance is merely
sought as a "remed[y] available to enforce the judgment."). See, e.g., Ottley v.
Schwartzberg, 819 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1987).
28. See Part III for a description of the federal decisions specifically address-
ing the merits of a claim under Article VI.
29. See discussion infra Part II.
30. Articles V(1)(e) and VI (note that Article V(1)Ce) addresses prior decisions
to suspend or set aside an award and not a pending matter as contemplated un-
der Article VI).
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jurisdiction of enforcement.3'
Similarly, since "there is no comparable international
convention dealing *ith the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments,"32 any standards guiding the enforcement of judgments
is inapplicable to the New York Convention. Contrary to the
federal law of arbitration codified in the Federal Arbitration
Act, "[t]he law of each state controls recognition of foreign
judgments in that state,"33 and federal courts apply state laws
in all cases arising out of "diversity" and "alienage," but apply
federal law in "federal-question" cases. Nevertheless, if a com-
parison is made between the standards for foreign judgments
and an Article VI stay, "most U.S. jurisdictions recognize and
enforce the judgments of other countries... ,"3 contradicting
the near "absolute stay" invoked by federal courts in cases
involving enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 5
Lastly, staying enforcement of a foreign award under Arti-
cle VI finds no domestic analog. By virtue of the U.S.
Constitution's "full faith and credit clause,"36 state courts
must respect the judgments of other state courts. This clause
applies to U.S. states only and does not apply to judgments
issued by foreign countries. In the domestic context, the full
faith and credit clause avoids the risk of an inconsistency evi-
dent in an international context. Furthermore, there is a lesser
chance of inconsistency in judicial interpretation of domestical-
ly rendered arbitral awards because the Federal Arbitration
Act codifies the federal law applicable to each state and will
supersede the laws of the individual state where conflict ex-
ists.37 In sum, the following proposition holds true for both
31. For example, even if a federal court denies the enforcement of an award
rendered-in accordance with Japanese law and affirmed by a Japanese court, the
federal court is not offending the Japanese court, or its law, if such denial is
based on the premise that enforcement would violate the public policy of the Unit-
ed States under Article V(2)(b).
32. von Mehren, supra note 8, at 153-154 (emphasis added).
33. Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is our Need for a Judgments-Recog-
nition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get it?, 24 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 167, 173 (No.1 1998) (citations omitted) (arguing for the need of an inter-
national judgments-recognition convention and suggesting that an enforcing state
mirror the circumstances in the rendering state: "[ilf enforcement is stayed where
rendered either automatically on appeal or on posting of a bond, enforcement
should be suspended elsewhere." (citation omitted)). Id. at 206.
34. Id. at 168.
35. See infra Part III.
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
37. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Furthermore, federal law provides for
1846 •.[Vol. XXVI:4
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the recognition of judgments and arbitration awards:
[wie cannot automatically derive solutions for interna-
tional practice from decisions respecting recognition of judg-
ments of sister-states. Considerations of convenience and of
doctrinal symmetry may tend toward similar results in the
two areas. But in theory - and as a basis for full understand-
ing of the implicated problems - international recognition
practice should be treated separately from federal-system
practice.
38
III. ARTICLE VI CONSIDERED UNDER U.S. CASELAW
A. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc.
Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc.3' represents
the first instance in which an American court fully addresses
the issue of whether to stay enforcement under Article VI of
the New York Convention. In Fertilizer Corp. of India, the
predecessors in interest to Fertilizer Corp. of India ("FCI") and
IDI Management, Inc. ("IDI") entered into a contract for the
construction of a nitrophosphate plant in India. ° Dissatisfied
with the results of the work done by IDI, FCI sought recourse
via arbitration through the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC") as required under the contract.41 The arbitral
panel unanimously awarded FCI a sum in excess of one million
U.S. dollars ("Nitrophosphate Award"). Prior to the
Nitrophosphate Award, the same arbitration panel granted IDI
an award against FCI under a contract separate from FCrs
an automatic stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment pending an appeal by a
party "giving a supersedeas bond" (subject to a court's approval). FED R. CIV. P.
62(d).
38. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign
Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1607
(1968). Nevertheless, the federal bias towards compelling arbitration in a domestic
context is extended to the enforcement of an award. "Just as 'exceptional
circumstances' must exist in order to prevent a Court from compelling arbitra-
tion ... a party seeking a stay to the enforcement of an arbitration award should
be required to make a similarly strong showing." Holz-Her U.S., Inc. v. Monarch
Mach., Inc., 47 F. Supp.2d 646 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (denying a motion to stay consid-
eration of a motion to confirm and enter judgment on an award).
39. 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981), reh'g denied, 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.
Ohio 1982).
40. Id. at 950.
41. See id.
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petition in Fertilizer Corp. of India ("Methanol Award"). 2 At
the time FCI petitioned the U.S. District Court for enforcement
of the Nitrophosphate Award, IDI and FCI had respectively
commenced an action to set aside the Nitrophosphate and
Methanol Awards in Indian Courts. 3
In Fertilizer Corp. of India, U.S. District Judge S. Arthur
Spiegel expended a considerable amount of effort in denying
each of IDrs five affirmative defenses under Article V of the
New York Convention. In so doing, Judge Spiegel based his
findings on a policy enforcing arbitral agreements and awards
rendered therefrom." For example, in the Court's consider-
ation of IDrs Article V(1)(c) defense that the arbitrators ex-
ceeded their authority by granting consequential damages, a
remedy specifically excluded under the original agreement of
the parties, the Court showed complete deferrence to the arbi-
trators, opining that "(t)he Convention 'does not sanction sec-
ond-guessing the arbitrator's construction of the parties' agree-
ment,' nor would it be proper for this Court 'to usurp the
arbitrator's role."'45 In finding that the arbitrators did not ex-
ceed their authority, Judge Spiegel cited the Supreme Court
for its broad support of arbitration:
Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide
the matters submitted to them, finally and without appeal.
As a mode of settling disputes, it should receive every encour-
agement from the courts of equity. If the award is within the
submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitra-
tors, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of
equity will not set it aside from error, either in law or fact. A
contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of
the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties,
and would make an award the commencement, not the end,
of litigation.46
Initially, Judge Spiegel promoted a pro-enforcement stance
in his analysis of whether to stay enforcement under Article VI
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. 517 F. Supp. 948, 959 (quoting Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., 508
F.2d at 977).
46. Id. at 959-60 (quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349, 15
L.Ed. 96 (1854)).
1848 [Vol. XXVI:4
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of the Nitrophosphate Award pending the determination of
IDrs appeal in the Indian Court. The Ohio District Court re-
lied on Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.41 for the proposition that
there is a need to enforce arbitral awards in order to effectuate
the purposes of the Convention.4" But, without a full expla-
nation, the Court contradicted its pro-enforcement position by
stating that "in order to avoid the possibility of an inconsistent
result, this Court has determined to adjourn its decision on
enforcement of the Nitrophosphate Award until the Indian
courts decide with finality whether the award is correct under
Indian law."49 Such a reversal is particularly vexing when
considering the Judge's interpretation of Article VI as "an
unfettered grant of discretion; the Court has been unable to
discover any standard on which a decision to adjourn should be
based, other than to ascertain that an application to set aside
or suspend the award has been made."" The Fertilizer Corp.
of India Court made no attempt to establish a standard or to
discuss any presumption in favor of the agreement entered into
by the parties. Instead, emphasis was placed merely upon the
fact that an appeal was pending in India.51
In addition to the inconsistency between the decision to
stay enforcement and the overall purpose of the Convention to
encourage enforcement of arbitral awards,52 Judge Spiegel,
without explanation, mistakenly predicated the stay on a "fi-
nal" Indian court decision.53 Finality of an award is not re-
quired under the Convention. To the contrary, the Convention
only requires that the award be binding.54 Contrary to Judge
47. 417 U.S. 506.
48. See Fertilizer Corp. of India, 517 F. Supp. at 961. "'A parochial refusal by
the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement would
not only frustrate [the Convention's] purposes, but would invite unseemly and
mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantag-
es.' [Scherk] at 516-517. The same would be true of a parochial refusal to enforce
an arbitral award under the Convention."
49. Id. at 962 (emphasis added) (also allowing FCI to seek an order for the
payment of security under Article VI).
50. Id. at 961 (emphasis added).
51. See id. at 962.
52. See id. at 961.
53. Id. at 963.
54. Cf. New York Convention, supra note 1 (Article V(1)(e) allows a court to
refuse enforcement of an award if the party against whom it is invoked proves
that it is not binding.).
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Spiegel's use of "finality" in his consideration of Article VI, the
Court found the "Nitrophosphate Award final and binding, for
purpose of the Convention."55 The Fertilizer Corp. of India
Court even recognized the commentary of Gerald Aksen on the
issue of a "binding" award:
The award will be considered 'binding' for the purposes
of the Convention if no further recourse may be had to anoth-
er arbitral tribunal (that is, an appeals tribunal). The fact
that recourse may be had to a court of law does not prevent
the award from being binding.' This provision should make it
more difficult for an obstructive loser to postpone or prevent
enforcement by bringing, or threatening to bring, proceedings
to have an award set aside or suspended.56
Fertilizer Corp. of India laid a foundation for federal re-
view under Article VI of a court's "unfettered discretion" to
stay enforcement of an arbitral award. However, despite the
pro-enforcement policy articulated throughout Fertilizer Corp.
of India, the issuance of a stay was an unexplained contra-
diction leaving future courts without a standard for guidance.
B. Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A.
Judge Charles S. Haight's decision in Spier v.
Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A."7 also addresses the issue of
whether to stay enforcement of a commercial arbitral award
under Article VI. In Spier, Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.p.A.
("Tecnica"), an Italian corporation, contracted Martin Spier
("Spier"), a United States citizen, to supply expertise for the
manufacture of ski boots.58 Spier sought recourse in accor-
dance with the contractual "provision providing for resolution
of disputes by a panel of three arbitrators in Italy."59 Follow-
ing the panel's unanimous decision to award Spier the equiva-
lent of nearly seven hundred thousand U.S. dollars, Tecnica
55. Fertilizer Corp. of India, 517 F. Supp. at 957.
56. Id. at 958 (quoting Gerald Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives
in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 SW. U. L. REV. 1,
11 (1971)).
57. 663 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
58. Id. at 872.
59. Id. (Judge Haight's decision omits the factual circumstances underlying the
dispute).
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commenced an action in an Italian court to set aside the
award." Subsequently, Spier filed a petition in federal court
to enforce the award."
Tecnica asserted three bases under Article V upon which
Spier's petition should be dismissed, and in the alternative,
Tecnica sought to have the Court stay its decision pending the
determination of the challenges posed in the Italian court.62
Although Judge Haight clearly defines the positions under
Tecnica's first defense of whether the Italian procedure of
"arbitrato irrituale" can give rise to an award which is binding
under V(1)(e) of the Convention no attempt is made to decide
the merits of any of the Article V challenges.63
The Spier Court appears to have relied upon the discre-
tionary nature of a stay of enforcement under Article VI to
avoid the necessity of making a determination on the merits of
Tecnica's other defenses.' Judge Haight ordered a stay so as
to defer to the findings of the Italian courts on all of the de-
fenses placed before him even though Tecnica's assertion under
V(1)(e) was not raised as a question to be settled under its
Italian claims.65 Like Fertilizer Corp. of India, Spier fails to
articulate a coherent standard of whether to impose a stay for
any reason other than that a court should automatically defer
to the findings of the court in the jurisdiction in which the
arbitral award was rendered. Judge Haight opined:
I would deny Article VI adjournment of the enforcement
proceedings here only if I were satisfied that Tecnica's liti-
gation position in Italy was transparently frivolous. I cannot
reach that conclusion on the present record. That being so, it
is better to permit the validity of this Italian arbitral award
to be first tested under Italian law by Italian courts. That is
prefereable to an American court seeking to apply the law of
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 873.
63. Spier, 663 F. Supp. at 874.
64. Id. at 874-75 (citing to Article VI and Fertilizer Corp. of India as evidence
of a court's discretion).
65. Id. at 875. "I do not conceive the italian courts to be presented with the
question of whether this "arbitratio irrituale" falls within and is enforceable under
the Convention. That question ... would not seem to arise in Italy .... But
clearly the Italian courts must consider under Italian law the nature of the award,
and the permissible scope of the challenges Tecnica may assert against it, includ-
ing the alleged invalidity of the entire contract."
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the foreign country where the award was made, and entering
an order enforcing an award later condemned by the courts of
that foreign country."
Although the Spier Court's seemingly automatic stay
seems to contradict the pro-enforcement purposes of the Con-
vention, the Court did hold that the party against whom en-
forcement is sought bears the burden of proving why it should
not post a security in the full amount of the award pending the
disposition in the court of origin.67 In a later Memorandum
Opinion and Order, Judge Haight implies that the posting of
security is a basis upon which a stay of enforcement is grant-
ed.68
Judge Haight's decision to stay enforcement in Spier was
correct as to its results despite its imperfect reasoning. In
October 1999, Judge Haight issued a Memorandum and Order
denying Spier's petition for enforcement of the award because
Italy's highest court had validated the findings of two lower
courts granting Tecnica's petition to set aside the award.69
Although Spier III did not attempt to address any issues asso-
ciated with an Article VI stay, it is important to note that the
Italian courts set aside the arbitral award because the arbitra-
tion panel had exceeded its powers by awarding compensation
outside the scope of the contract7" and the Italian courts
"demonstrated no particular interest in the distinction between
an 'arbitrato rituale' and an 'arbitrato irrituale."7 Even on
reflection, in Spier III, Judge Haight merely deferred to the
authority of the Italian courts without even discussing the
merits of Tecnica's claims or the federal court's ability to re-
solve the dispute.
Proponents of the decisions in Spier and Spier III may
argue that Judge Haight's decision to stay enforcement gave
due respect to the notion of comity and as a result allowed the
66. Id.
67. Id. at 876.
68. See Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., No. 86 CIV. 3447 (CSH), 1988
WL 96839, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1988) [hereinafter Spier Ill. "If a party such
as Tecnica fails to post security, then it would seem that the proper remedy would
be to deny its application for an adjournment of the decision." Id.
69. See Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., 71 F. Supp.2d 279 (S.D.N.Y.
1999), rehg denied, 77 F. Supp.2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter Spier II1].
70. Id. at *2-3.
71. Id. at *5.
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enforcing court to avoid the possibility of wrongfully enforcing
a foreign arbitral award.72 However, the failure to even ad-
dress the merits of the claims (other than those impertinent to
final disposition) or to articulate a standard for a stay of en-
forcement only serves to undermine the purposes of the New
York Convention. The "unfettered discretion" first articulated
in Fertilizer Corp. of India is reduced to nothing more than an
automatic stay, a policy, which if adopted unanimously by the
federal courts, may spur all "arbitral losers" to seek review by
the competent authority in the jurisdiction of origin. A policy of
an automatic stay is not endorsed by the language and purpose
of the New York Convention. If it was, then a stay would be
contingent merely upon the posting of security.73
C. Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp. v. Nigerian Nat'l
Petroleum Corp.
Judge John F. Keenan's stay of an award under Article VI
in Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp. v. Nigerian Nat'l
Petroleum Corp.74 represents nothing more than a verbatim
application of the reasoning used in Spier. In Caribbean Trad-
ing and Fidelity Corp., no mention was made as to the purpose
of the New York Convention or to the general federal bias in
favor of arbitration and its enforcement.75
Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp. involved a dispute
over a contract entered into between Caribbean Trading &
Fidelity Corp. ("CTFC")76, an Anguillan, British West Indies
72. Spier is an exception in that "[iut rarely occurs that an action for setting
aside the award existent in the country of origin is successful. In fact, out of the
288 reported court decisions, in only one case did a court set aside an award in
the country of its origin." Michael Tupman, Staying Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards under the New York Convention, 3 ARB. INVL 209, 222 (1987) (citing Jan
van den Berg, 11 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 399, 458 (1986)).
73. See Tupman, supra note 72, at 221. The posting of security alone, also
does not resolve the problems of an automatic stay because "a statutory or other
fixed rate [of interest] might be applied which is well below the actual loss to the
claimant. Furthermore, from a business perspective it might be more important for
the claimant to have the money now . . . than years later with interest." Id. at
222 (citation omitted).
74. No. 90 CIV. 4169 (JFK), 1990 WL 213030 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1990), reh'g
denied, No. 90 CIV. 4169 (JFK), 1991 WL 64181 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 1991), appeal
dismissed, 948 F.2d 111 (2nd Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992).
75. See generally Scherk, 417 U.S. 506.
76. CTFC acted as an agent for and on behalf of the Government of St.
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corporation, and Nigerian National Petroleum Corp. ("NNrPC"),
a Nigerian corporation and governmental entity.77 CTFC pre-
sented the dispute before an arbitral panel selected by the
parties under the Nigerian Arbitration Act as provided for by
the contract.7' Following the issuance of an award in favor of
CTFC, NNPC originated an action in the High Court of Lagos
State in Lagos, Nigeria. NNPC sought to have the award set
aside on various grounds, including, but not limited to, the
notion that the contract was made between two govern-
ments.79 As of the time Judge Keenan rendered his decision
in Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp., litigation was still
pending in the High Court regarding NNPC's application to
have the original award set aside and CFTC's appeal of a deni-
al of its motion to have NNPC's application set aside.
In Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp., the Court dis-
cussed, but made no decision upon, the issue of NNPC's juris-
dictional immunity under the rubric of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330.80 Due to the Court's grant
of NNPC's request for a stay pending the disposition of the
action before the High Court in Nigeria, no judicial determina-
tion was made as to the findings of the arbitrators.8 1 Judge
Keenan merely reiterated Judge Haight's decision in Spier82
deferring to the High Court of Lagos and stating that "(t)he
same logic applies in this case, especially where the evidence
indicates that the arbitrators may not have considered all of
the evidence before them."' Although the Court made a sum-
mary statement that the Nigerian action was not frivolous, it
made no effort to articulate how all of the evidence may not
have been considered by the arbitrators.' In light of the issu-
ance of a stay under Article VI, the Caribbean Trading and
Christopher and Nevis (St. Kitts). See Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp., No.
90 CIV. 4169, 1990 WL 213030, at *1.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at *3.
80. Id. at *4-6 (NNPC asserts that because CTFC acted on behalf of the gov-
ernment of St. Kitts that the contract was made between two governments and is
therefore not a private contract).
81. See id. at *7-8.
82. Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp., 1990 WL 213030, at *7; see also
infra Part III.
83. Id. at *7.
84. See id. at *7-8.
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Fidelity Corp. Court ordered NNPC to post security in the
amount set forth in the original award.85
Although NNPC and CTFC eventually settled their dis-
pute prior to judicial resolution in the United States or Nige-
ria,86 Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp. remains as an
example of the federal courts' failure to articulate a standard
for staying enforcement under Article VI of the New York
Convention. Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp. goes even
further than Spier in exhibiting an "unfettered discretion" to
automatically stay enforcement and the ability of a court to
divorce itself from the purposes of the Convention as imple-
mented in the Federal Arbitration Act.
D. Ukrvneshprom State Foreign Econ. Enter. v. Tradeway, Inc.
Ukrvneshprom State Foreign Econ. Enter. v. Tradeway,
Inc.87 represents an exception from the federal courts' seem-
ingly "automatic" stay of enforcement under Article VI of the
New York Convention. Ukrvneshprom stemmed from two con-
tractual agreements made by Tradeway, Inc. ("Tradeway"), a
New York corporation, and Ukrvneshprom State Foreign Eco-
nomic Enterprise ("USFEE"), a Ukranian corporation, provid-
ing for the purchase of steel and iron products by Tradeway
from USFEE. Both contracts entered into by Tradeway and
USFEE provided for the resolution "of disputes by the Court of
Arbitration at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of
Ukraine, Kiev."89 In 1995, USFEE initiated an action before
the Arbitral Authority for which USFEE was awarded in ex-
cess of six million U.S. dollars for Tradeway's breach of the two
contracts.0 Tradeway responded to the award by petitioning
the City Court of Kiev, Ukraine to set aside the award and by
commencing a "'counterclaim arbitration' against USFEE with
the Arbitral Authority ... ."" At the time of Judge Robert P.
85. Id. at *8.
86. See Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp. v. Nigerian Nafl Pertoleum Co.,
No. 90 CIV. 4169 (JFK), 1993 WL 541236, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993).
87. No. 95 CIV. 10278 (RPP), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2827, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 11, 1996) [hereinafter Ukrvneshproml.
88. Id. at *2.
89. Id. at *2-3 ("Arbitral Authority").
90. See id. at *4.
91. Id.
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Patterson's decision in Vkrvneshprom, Tradeway's petition to
have the award set aside by the Kiev City Court had been
denied and was under review by the Supreme Court of the
Ukraine."
In Ukrvneshprom, Tradeway asserted three Article V de-
fenses on the basis of which the Court should deny enforce-
ment of the original award. Relying on Fertilizer Corp. of India
and the contractual provision that provided for the finality of
an award issued by the Arbitral Authority, the Ukrvneshprom
Court found against Tradeway's first assertion under Article
V(1)(e) that the award was not binding.93 Second, Judge
Patterson found that Tradeway's own failure to invoke proce-
dures of the Arbitral Authority for the presentation of evidence
precluded the application of an Article V(1)(b) defense that it
was unable to present its case. 4 Finally, Judge Patterson con-
cluded that based upon Tradeway's inability to assert any
factors supporting its proposition under Article V(2)(b), the
public policy of the United States is not violated by the en-
forcement of the award."
Following the denial of Tradeway's Article V defenses and
based upon a court's "unfettered discretion" to stay enforce-
ment under Article VI, as articulated in Fertilizer Corp. of
India,96 Judge Patterson enforced the arbitral award issued
by the Arbitral Authority despite pending judicial review in the
Ukraine.9" Judge Patterson carefully balanced the goal of the
Convention to promote the enforcement of awards98 against
"the risk that the power to stay could be abused by disgruntled
litigants ... [which] argues more for a cautious and prudent
exercise of the power than for its elimination."99 Judge
Patterson appears to implement Spier's "frivolous" exception to
staying enforcement0 0 in finding that "... Tradeway is en-
92. Id. at *5.
93. Ukrvneshprom, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2827, at *9-13.
94. See id. at *13-16.
95. See id. at *18.
96. See id. See also supra Part HLI.A.
97. See Ukvrneshprom, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2827, at *1.
98. See id. at *19; see also Fertilizer Corp. of India, 517 F. Supp. 948.
99. Ukrvneshprom, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2827, at *19-20 (quoting Hewlett-
Packard Co., Inc. v. Berg. 61 F.3d .101, 106 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that although
Article VI of the New York Convention did not apply, the district court may stay
an action to enforce an arbitral award for other reasons).
100. See Spier, 663 F. Supp. 871.
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gaged in obstructive litigation while it conducts transactions
intended to avoid the effect of the [a]ward."10 ' Judge
Patterson's decision was based upon the following findings: (i)
the claims of Tradeway remain unsubstantiated other than by
representations of its lawyers; (ii) the exclusion of a 'critical'
phrase in a translation of Ukranian law provided by Tradeway;
(iii) the indeterminacy of Tradeway's claims; and (iv) the liqui-
dation of Tradeway's assets by sale of all assets and liabilities
to Tradeway West, Inc., a New York corporation, whose sole
shareholder was an employee of Tradeway, two days prior to
the issuance of the arbitral award:'
10 2
Although the courts in Spier and Caribbean Trading and
Fidelity Corp. noted the existence of the "frivolous" exception
to staying enforcement," 3 neither contained more than a
cursory conclusion as to the inapplicability of the exception.
Despite Ukrvneshprom's failure to establish a standard for a
stay under Article VI, it does represent an initial attempt by a
federal Court to address the factors to be considered in decid-
ing whether to stay enforcement.
E. Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc.
Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc. 4 repre-
sents the only instance in which a U.S. Court of Appeals has
attempted to articulate the factors that are to be considered in
granting a stay under the New York Convention. °5 Although
the Second Circuit admittedly made no attempt to define a
standard for staying an award under Article VI, its review of
the District Court's denial of a stay for an abuse of discretion
did at least establish a framework from which a standard may
arise.
0 6
101. Ukrvneshprom, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2827, at *24.
102. See id. at *20-23.
103. See Spier, 663 F. Supp. 871; Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp., No. 90
CIV. 4169, 1990 WL 213030.
104. Europcar Italia, S.p-.A, 156 F.3d 310.
105. See Consorcio Rive, SA de C.V. v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc., No. CIV.A. 99-
2204 (CS), slip op., 1999 WL 1009806, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 1999).
106. "We agree with [Hewlett-Packard Co., Inc. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101, 106 (1st
Cir. 1995)], that adjournment should be decided by the district court in the first
instance. We also conclude that in light of the permissive language of Article VI of
the Convention and a district court's general discretion in managing its own case-
load and suspense docket .... the proper standard for reviewing a court's decision
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Europcar Italia, S.p.A. arises out of a contractual agree-
ment between Maiellano Tours, Inc. ("Maiellano"), an Ameri-
can corporation, and Europcar Italia, S.p.A. ("Europcar"), an
Italian corporation, which was to rent cars to customers re-
ferred by Maiellano. °7 The original agreement provided that
all disputes will be "finally resolved" by a sole arbitrator under
Italian legal rules known as "arbitrato irrituale in equita" or
"informal proceedings."'0 8 Subsequent to a dispute that arose
between the parties regarding the remittance of value-added-
tax refunds and their inability to agree upon a sole arbitrator,
the parties entered into a supplemental arbitration
agreement.' 9 The supplemental agreement provided for a
panel of three arbitrators. In accord with the original agree-
ment, the award was to be final and determined in accordance
with the procedure of "arbitrato irrituale."" ° Europcar then
sought to have the award rendered by the arbitral panel en-
forced by the Tribunal of Rome and Maiellano initiated an
action to have the award set aside by the same Italian court of
first instance."' Prior to the disposition of the Italian actions,
Europcar sought and was granted enforcement of its award by
Judge Carol Bagley Amon in the Eastern District of New
York.1'
2
Presented with Maiellano's four claims on appeal, the
Europcar Italia, S.pA. Court ultimately narrowed its decision
to the issue of whether to stay enforcement under Article VI in
remanding the action for further consideration by Judge Amon.
Maiellano's first contention that an award reached under
arbitrato irrituale is not binding and enforceable was also at
issue in Spier."' Although the Europcar Italia, S.p.A. Court
illustrated the arguments involved with the enforceability of
an arbitrato irrituale proceeding, the Court found that resolu-
tion of the issue was not necessary for disposition of the case
whether to adjourn is for abuse of discretion." Europcar Italia, S.p.A., 156 F.3d at
316-17.
107. Id. at 312.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Europcar Italia, S.p.A, 156 F.3d at 312.
112. See Id. at 312-13 (Judge Amon's decision reflected the partial adoption of
a Report and Recommendation prepared by Magistrate Judge Steven R. Gold,
granting Europcar's motion for summary judgment).
113. See supra Part III.(B).
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and therefore made no final determination."4 However, the
Europcar Italia, S.p.A. Court did find under Maiellano's second
contention that the District Court was correct in determining
that the parties intended to be bound by the arbitration
award."5 Furthermore, Judge Amon's decision that enforce-
ment of the arbitration award does not violate United States'
public policy under Article V(2)(B) of the New York Convention
was affirmed in Europcar Italia, S.p.A. because the issue of
whether the agreement, upon which the award was based, was
a forgery was for the arbitrators to decide."6
Based upon Maiellano's final argument that a stay of en-
forcement was proper pending the resolution of the Italian
actions, the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded Judge
Amon's decision for further consideration."7 The Europcar
Italia, S.p.A. Court based its decision on the perception that
the District Court did not consider the competing concerns
associated to granting a stay."8 The concerns of staying en-
forcement outlined in Europcar Italia, S.p.A., such as the pur-
poses of arbitration and comity, were addressed more fully by
balancing the following non-exhaustive list of factors:
(1) the general objectives of arbitration-the expeditious reso-
lution of disputes and the avoidance of protracted and expen-
sive litigation;
(2) the status of the foreign proceedings and the estimated
time for those proceedings to be resolved;
(3) whether the award sought to be enforced will receive
greater scrutiny in the foreign proceedings under a less defer-
ential standard of review;
(4) the characteristics of the foreign proceedings including (i)
whether they were brought to enforce an award (which would
tend to weigh in favor of a stay) or to set the award aside
(which would tend to weigh in favor of enforcement); (ii)
whether they were initiated before the underlying enforce-
ment proceeding so as to raise concerns of international comi-
ty; (iii) whether they were initiated by the party now seeking
to enforce the award in federal court; and (iv) whether they
were initiated under circumstances indicating an intent to
114. See Europcar Italia, S.pA., 156 F.3d at 314.
115. Id. at 315.
116. Id. at 315-16.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 317.
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hinder or delay resolution of the dispute;
(5) a balance of the possible hardships to each of the parties,
keeping in mind that if enforcement is postponed under Arti-
cle VI..., the party seeking enforcement may receive 'suit-
able security' and that under Article V... an award should
not be enforced if it is set aside or suspended in the originat-
ing country... ; and
(6) any other circumstances that could tend to shift the bal-
ance in favor of or against adjournment."'
Although the Second Circuit provided some guidance by
articulating a list of factors for Judge Amon to consider on
remand, the usefulness of Europcar Italia, S.p.A. is limited by
its failure to establish the weight to be given to each of the
factors and by the unlimited breadth afforded under the sixth
consideration. In light of the goal of the New York Convention,
the Second Circuit did place greater emphasis on the first two
factors.2 ° However, the Second Circuit made no effort at pro-
viding a formula for weighing the factors and did not articulate
whether there is even a presumption in favor of enforcement
that must be overcome before a stay is granted by a federal
district court. The instructiveness of Europcar Italia, S.p.A. is
further limited because the Italian actions were disposed of in
favor of Europcar prior to a ruling by Judge Amon of the issue
on remand."l
Moreover, Europcar Italia, S.p.A. is inherently flawed
since, although the Court of Appeals acknowledged the author-
ity and discretion of a district court in deciding whether to stay
enforcement, the Court did not make- reference to Judge
Amon's failure to consider arguments elicited by Maiellano.
Instead, the Second Circuit usurped Judge Amon's authority
by delineating its own list of factors she should have consid-
ered without acknowledging her use of discretion when origi-
nally ordering enforcement. As instructive as the concerns
articulated in Europcar Italia, S.p.A. are, the decision to re-
mand serves as an additional obstacle to enforcement and
therefore, contradicts the goals of the New York Convention
119. Id. at 317-18.
120. See Europcar Italia, S.pA, 156 F.3d at 318.
121. This information may be found from docket sheets attainable at the Dis-
trict Courthouse for the Eastern District of New York under the identifying docket
number "94-CV-3658" (Documents nos. 45-48).
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and the parties' agreement providing for a final resolution.
Although Europcar Italia, S.pA did not promote the goals
of the New York Convention by remanding Judge Amon's deci-
sion to enforce the arbitral award, the balancing factors pre-
sented by the Second Circuit serve as an important step for-
ward in defining a federal standard under Article VI.
Yet the potential legacy of Europcar Italia, S.p.A. may
actually be that of a hinderance to the development of a stan-
dard for staying enforcement in compliance with the purposes
of the New York Convention. Consorcio Rive, S-A. de C.V. v.
Briggs of Cancun, Inc.22 serves as the first, yet incomplete,
application of the factors set forth in Europcar Italia, S.p.A.
Consorcio Rive, SA. de C.V. involves a situation in which an
arbitral award was rendered in Mexico under Mexican law as
provided for by a lease agreement between the parties.'
Prior to Consorcio Rive, S.A. de C.V.'s. (Rive) action to enforce
the award in the Eastern District of Louisiana, Briggs of
Cancun, Inc. (Briggs) sought to have the award set aside by a
"nullity action" brought against the arbitration panel in a Mex-
ican court for violations of Mexican procedural law.' Prior
to Briggs's application for a stay of enforcement, "the Mexican
court sua sponte dismissed the nullity action" and Briggs ap-
pealed such dismissal.' In preliminarily denying Briggs's
motion to stay the enforcement of the arbitral award, Judge
Charles Schwartz, Jr. evaluated how each factor articulated in
Europcar Italia, S.p.A applied to the action at hand.'26 Nev-
ertheless, Judge Schwartz granted the parties an additional
opportunity to research Mexican law to determine if the appeal
was devolutive, the anticipated duration of the proceedings,
and the security necessary if the stay was granted.' 7
Based upon further submissions, Judge Schwartz found
that "the effect of the dismissal of the nullity action [had] been
suspended by the appeal, so that action 'for the setting aside or
122. Consorcio Rive, S. de C.V., 1999 WL 1009806, at *1 (a final disposition
of this action has not been rendered as of the completion of this Note).
123. Id. at *1.
124. See Consorcio Rive, SA de C.V., No. CIVA. 99-2204 (CS), 2000 WL 98127
(Jan. 26, 2000 E.D. La.) (Rive is not a party to the nullity action).
125. Consorcio Rive, S.A. de C.V., 1999 WL 1009806, at * 1.
126. See id. at *2.
127. See id.
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suspension of the award' is unresolved." 2 ' As a result, the
enforcement proceedings were stayed pending the defendants'
posting of a bond in the sum of the original award."9 In
granting a stay, Judge Schwartz ultimately relied upon the
notion that "a foreign court well-versed in its own law is better
suited to determine the validity of the award.""0 Consorcio
Rive, SA de C.V. represents a conscious effort by the court not
to address the merits of the nullity action, the dismissal of
which does not affect the binding nature of the award, but
instead suspends the effect of dismissal. Regardless of the
eventual disposition of Consorcio Rive, SA. de C.V. and the
future application of Europcar Italia, S.p.A, these cases illus-
trate that a blind adherence to the notion of comity merely
reaffirms the federal practice of an absolute stay while violat-
ing the goal of the New York Convention to eliminate the need
for double exequator.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Fertilizer Corp. of India and its progeny illustrate, the
failure of the federal courts to articulate a definitive standard
for staying the enforcement of foreign commercial arbitral
awards under Article VI of the New York Convention has led
to an ad hoc determination usually resulting in an automatic
stay. This general practice is repugnant to the goals of the
Convention because it contradicts the notion that "[i]n order to
obtain the benefit of the New York Convention, a party apply-
ing for recognition or enforcement of an award is not required
to initiate proceedings in the country of origin of the
award.""' Even though the party seeking enforcement does
not have to "initiate" a proceeding in the country of origin, an
automatic stay nevertheless requires the enforcing party to
submit to a system of double exequator.
Even though Ukrvneshprom stands apart from federal case
law, and seems to support the goals of the Convention by its
denial of a stay of enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, it
still fails to define a proper standard encompassing the need to
128. Consoreio Rive, SA de C.V., 2000 WL 98127, at *3.
129. See id. at *4.
130. Id. at *3 (quoting Europcar Italia, S.p-A, 156 F.3d at 317).
131. See FOUCHARD, supra note 9, at para. 1677.
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avoid double exequator and the promotion of party autonomy.
One commentator promotes a standard analogous to that used
by federal courts in exercising their discretion to stay an in-
junctive order from enforcing a final judgment pending an
appeal under FED.R.CIV.P. 62(c).'32 Similarly, another ap-
proach only allows a stay to be granted if "the opposing party
can demonstrate that the balance of potential harms to each of
the parties weighs in favor of a stay."33 Despite any merit
contained in these theories or the result attained in
Ukrvneshprom, the elimination of a need for double exequator
must retain its paramount importance when considering en-
forcement under the New York Convention.
Underlying the system of double exequator lies the princi-
ple of party autonomy. The risk of an incorrect award is real
and is in the minds of the parties when initially contracting for
the resolution of disputes by an arbitral forum. An enforcing
party merely seeks enforcement from a decision resulting from
its original bargain. In light of the rare instance when review
is necessary, the parties may contract for a method of review
as a predicate to the award's achievement of a binding nature.
This form of review allows the parties to assert their own
needs in achieving a final resolution which limits the time and
expense associated with a protracted litigation.
Europcar Italia, S.pA. represents a significant step by the
federal courts in defining a standard to stay enforcement under
Article VI. However, the factors proposed by the Second Circuit
illustrate the tension experienced by federal courts in escaping
the inherent resistance to arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution. The Europcar Italia, S.p.A. Court limited any pre-
sumption in favor of enforcement to "the general objectives of
arbitration,"" but fails to recognize "party autonomy" as the
preeminent concern to be advanced by enforcement. Further-
more, Consorcio Rive, SA. de C.V. illustrates that mere con-
templation of the factors articulated by the Second Circuit
132. See Strub, supra note 4 (this standard requires a balancing of "(1) wheth-
er the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on
the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay, (3)
whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested
in the proceeding, and (4) where the public interest lies.") (citations omitted). Id.
at 1064.
133. See Tupman, supra note 72.
134. Europcar Italia, S.p-.A, 156 F.3d 310.
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without a true prioritization in favor of enforcement will yield
a practice contravening the purposes of the New York Conven-
tion.
Decisions such as Mitsubishi Motors Corp. and Scherk
reflect the federal judiciary's growing acceptance of arbitration.
Nevertheless, the courts' failure to create a definitive standard
guiding the stay of enforcement of a foreign commercial arbi-
tral award under Article VI reflects a changing policy which is
not complete. The lack of a definitive standard has led to a
practice contravening the goals of both the Convention and the
parties who agreed to arbitrate their disputes.
Brian Sampson*
* The author would like to dedicate this Note to the memory of his father
and to all of the author's teachers who believe in untapped potential.
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